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█ Abstract The notion of a delusion occupies a central place in psychotherapy. The presence of delusional 
thinking in a patient is often regarded as indicative of psychosis. And yet, the nature of a delusion is still 
widely disputed. The difficulty of defining a delusion has proved so difficult that some prominent authors 
have declared the task impossible. The aim of this paper is to offer a characterisation of delusional systems 
of thought. In this paper is argued that delusions, unlike scientific explanations and the explanations general-
ly offered by common sense, fail to minimise that which requires explanation. In the first part of the paper, dif-
ficulties with extant accounts will be discussed. In the following parts, the author’s own account of delusional 
thoughts will be developed and some difficult cases considered. It will be argued that delusions differ from 
more typical beliefs in the number of things that they leave unexplained. Delusions, unlike those beliefs we 
typically see as rational, bring about an increase in the number of things requiring explanation.  
KEYWORDS: Delusions; Epistemology; Analysis; Explanation; Rationality 
 
 
█ Riassunto Aspetti epistemologici del pensiero delirante – La nozione di delirio occupa una posizione cen-
trale nell’ambito della psicoterapia. La presenza del pensiero delirante in un paziente è considerata spesso 
come un indice di psicosi. E, tuttavia, la natura del delirio non è ancora oggetto di ampio accordo tra gli 
studiosi. La difficoltà nel definire il delirio si è mostrata talmente ostica che diversi importanti studiosi 
hanno dichiarato questo compito impossibile. Lo scopo di questo lavoro è quello di offrire una caratteriz-
zazione dei sistemi di pensiero delirante. Si sosterrà che i deliri, diversamente dalle spiegazioni scientifiche 
e da quelle offerte generalmente dal senso comune, non riescono a ridurre quanto necessita di una spiegazio-
ne. Nella prima parte del lavoro, saranno discusse le difficoltà degli approcci correnti. Nelle parti seguenti 
verrà proposto l’approccio dell’autore ai pensieri deliranti e verranno presi in esame alcuni casi complessi. 
Si sosterrà che i deliri si distinguono dai casi più tipici di credenza per il numero di cose che lasciano senza 
spiegazione. I deliri, diversamente dalle credenze che tipicamente consideriamo irrazionali, determinano 
un incremento del numero di cose che richiedono una spiegazione. 
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THE NOTION OF A DELUSION occupies a central 
place in psychotherapy. The presence of delusion-
al thinking in a patient is regarded as indicative of 
psychosis.
1
 And yet, the nature of a delusion is still 
widely disputed. The difficulty of defining a delu-
sion has proved so difficult that David declared 
the task impossible.
2
 The aim of this paper is to 
offer a characterisation of delusions.  
It will be argued that delusions differ from 
more typical beliefs in the number of things that 
they leave unexplained. Delusions, unlike those 
beliefs we typically see as rational, bring about an 
increase in the number of things requiring expla-
nation. 
 
█  1 Introductory methodological remarks 
 
The aim of this paper is to characterise delu-
sions. More specifically, it will be argued that delu-
sions are to be differentiated from more typical 
beliefs by certain of their epistemological proper-
ties. Since epistemology is a branch of philosophy, 
delusions will therefore be characterised in terms 
that come from philosophy. However, the paper is 
an exercise in philosophy only in a rather specific 
sense: it uses terms and concepts from philosophy 
to characterise empirical phenomena.  
 The author will make no attempt to say 
how the account of delusions offered here might 
bear on clinical practice, beyond remarking that 
the paper offers an account of what delusions are, 
and an understanding of what they are may illu-
minate what it is that is to be treated. 
 
█  2 Difficulties with standard accounts of delu-
sional beliefs 
 
In a highly influential account, Karl Jaspers
3
 
said that a belief was delusional if it had three 
main characteristics: 
 
(1) The belief was held with absolute conviction; 
(2) The belief is resistant to (what would generally 
seem to be) reasonable or compelling counter-
argument; 
(3) The belief is implausible, bizarre or obviously 
false. 
 
However, this account has its difficulties. Per-
haps the most serious difficulty is that (1), (2) and 
(3) would seem to apply to many beliefs, ideas and 
theories that we would hesitate to call delusional. 
A wide range of scientific, religious and philosoph-
ical doctrines would also seem to meet these crite-
ria. Kuhn argued that scientists working within a 
“paradigm” firmly and uncritically accept the core 
theses of that paradigm.
4
 They continue to adhere 
to them even in the face of well attested-to coun-
ter-examples. Moreover, many of the claims of 
modern physics – such as that space contracts and 
time slows with increasing velocity, or that differ-
ent possible states of the universe literally exist – 
are surely, by the standards of common-sense, 
highly implausible and bizarre. The same could be 
said of a range of historically and currently influ-
ential philosophical doctrines.
5
 While we may be 
sceptical of the truth of many of these ideas, it 
seems wrong to say that those who are convinced 
of their truth are delusional. 
More recently, it has been asserted that, for a 
belief to be delusional, not only must it have (1) to 
(3) above, it must also 
 
(4) be a belief that is not accepted by a person’s 




This additional requirement ensures that many 
religious beliefs, and the beliefs of scientists within 
a paradigm, do not count as delusional. Neverthe-
less, some problems remain. One problem arises 
with innovators in science. When a scientist devel-
ops a new idea, he or she might be the only person 
who believes it to be correct. But we would be reluc-
tant to say the scientist was thereby delusional. 
There are, moreover, historically notable cases of 
scientists who were firmly convinced of the cor-
rectness of their innovative views, to the point of 
not admitting empirical evidence to the contrary.
7
 
Another difficulty is that we may be prepared to say 
under certain circumstances that all the members 
of a community suffered a delusion.
8
 But this would 
not be a conceptual possibility if a delusion is de-
fined as, among other things, a belief not accepted 
the community of which the believer is a member.  
An alternative approach is to characterise delu-
sions by reference to their effects. For a belief to 
count as delusional on this approach, it is neces-
sary that it prevent the believer from leading a 
productive life, or if it leads to dangerous or anti-
social behaviour.
9
 Plausibly, there is something 
right in this approach, since it is presumably a part 
of our concept of ill-health that it prevents the suf-
ferer from enjoying a full and productive life. But 
it also has its difficulties. One difficulty is that a 
person may believe something for good reasons, 
but its prima facie incredibility may lead the be-
liever to experience persecution, ostracism or ridi-
cule. An unfortunate but well- known case of this 
from the History of Science is Ludwig Boltzmann. 
Boltzmann’s theories led to widespread ridicule, 
which may have contributed to his suicide.
10
 Yet, 
Boltzmann’s theories, particularly his advocacy of 
the literal existence of atoms, were based on solid 
reasoning and were “ahead of his time”; we would 
hardly call his beliefs delusional.  
What these remarks suggest is that, while delu-
sions may tend to prevent the sufferer from lead-
ing a productive or healthy life, not all ideas that 
have this effect need be delusional. Some non-
delusional beliefs (such as those held by Boltz-
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mann) can also have these undesirable effects. De-
lusions are, as it were, a subset of those ideas that 
lead to dangerous or anti-social behaviour.  
 
█  3 Deviant thoughts versus delusional thoughts 
 
 It is appropriate at this point to briefly 
consider a very general question about the “spirit” 
in which a delusional patient “holds” or “accepts” 
their delusions. While some authors have held that 
a delusional literally believes their delusions, others 
have denied this. The “propositional attitude” 
adopted towards delusions is by some authors is 
held to be something other than belief.  
For the purposes of this paper, however, we do 
not need to address the question of the “proposi-
tional attitude” that patients adopt towards their 
delusions. We do, however, need terms to refer to 
the delusions themselves, and to the attitude pa-
tients adopt towards them. Here we will use the 
terms “ideas” and “thoughts” to refer to delusions. 
We will say patients “accept” their delusions, where 
to say “A accepts P” does not entail “A believes P”.
11
 
A possibly more extreme challenge to the view 
that a patient believes their delusion has been of-
fered by Gregory Currie. Currie suggests a delusion 
is really an imagining on the part of the patient, who 
then mistakes this imagining as a belief. However, 
before we are in a position to reply to Currie the 
view advocated here first needs to be stated. We re-
turn to Currie’s suggestion in Section 8, below. 
Let us call an idea that has (1)-(4) a deviant 
idea. As we have seen, a deviant idea need not be 
delusional. One task is to clarify the distinction 
between deviant ideas and delusional ideas. 
Some deviant ideas might be called sophisticat-
ed deviant ideas without being classed as delusion-
al. On the one hand, a scientific lay person who is 
convinced of the literal reality of “parallel univers-
es” – for example, of a universe in which Hitler 
won the war, or in which the Earth is populated by 
intelligent lobsters rather than humans – might be 
classed as delusional. But a “Modal Realist” phi-
losopher, or a cosmologist who believes in the ex-
istence of the “Multiverse”, might have rather sim-
ilar beliefs without necessarily being regarded as 
delusional. Roughly, we may say, a person might 
have very bizarre ideas yet not be delusional if 
they are also in possession of sufficiently good ar-
guments or reasons that make the “bizarre” beliefs 
rationally permissible to believe. 
Another way in which a person might have de-
viant beliefs without being delusional is if their 
perception is affected by, for example, hallucino-
genic drugs or certain medical conditions. A drug-
taker who believes there are snakes swarming 
across what is in fact a snake free lawn certainly 
has a bizarre belief, and it might qualify as a devi-
ant belief, but they would not generally be classed 
as a delusional. 
So, a deviant belief may fail to be delusional if 
it is a sophisticated belief for which there are good 
reasons, or, a deviant belief may be due to drugs or 
a medical condition without being delusional. 
This suggests that what makes an idea delusional 
is something about the way in which a person has 
arrived at it. More specifically, it suggests that an 
idea is delusional only if it is arrived at as a result 
of a bad reasoning process. We can perhaps ex-
press this in terms of the relationship between the 
premises available to a person and the conclusion 
they end up accepting. The drug taker who seems 
to see snakes swarming across the lawn starts with 
a premise such as “There seems for all the world to 
be snakes on the lawn” and draws the conclusion 
“There are snakes swarming across the lawn.” The 
relation between their premise and their conclu-
sion seems, prima facie, a reasonable one. Their 
initial premise is wrong, not because they are rea-
soning badly, but simply because they are halluci-
nating. A delusional, on the other hand, might 
have somehow come to the idea that the garden is 
infested with snakes even though they start from 
the same premises as the rest of us. A sophisticat-
ed quantum physicist might believe in the reality 
of a world in which Hitler won the war. But the 
physicist can defend this position by a chain of 
reasoning which, even if not accepted by all other 
physicists, at least commands their respect. Or, we 
might say: the chain of reasoning linking the phys-
icist’s premises with their conclusions is good 
enough to at least make their conclusion a ration-
ally permissible belief, even if it is not necessarily a 
belief that all rational persons ought to accept. But 
a delusional person’s acceptance of the reality of a 
world in which Hitler won the war does not have 
this characteristic. The delusional cannot, for ex-
ample, produce a chain of reasoning that would 
even render their idea rationally permissible. In 
this paper the view will be defended that what 
makes an idea delusional is that there is something 
wrong with the route taken from premises to the 
conclusion. There is a sense in which the delusion-
al has reasoned badly. 
There are three preliminary points that need to 
be noted. First, of course, it is not enough to mere-
ly say there is some sense in which the delusional 
has reasoned badly. We need to clarify in precisely 
what way, or ways, the reasoning of the delusional 
differs from what we would regard as good reason-
ing. Secondly, our account must allow that there 
can be a difference between a person being delu-
sional and simply making errors in reasoning. We 
all commit logical fallacies from time to time, but 
that need not make us delusional. And there is of 
course also a difference between being delusional 
and not being very bright. Conversely, it is possi-
ble for a person to be delusional and also be highly 
intelligent. Our account ought to be able to ex-




that there can be “shades of grey” between reason-
ing badly and reasoning well. If so, it seems plausi-
ble to think that there ought also to be shades of 
grey between being delusional and simply having 
odd beliefs. And, prima facie, this seems to be the 
case. Consider, for example, the set of all people 
who share some deviant idea – for example, that 
there exists a government conspiracy to conceal 
the truth about UFOs. Such persons might range 
from the clearly delusional, to those who are simp-
ly dogmatic in their adherence to an odd belief for 
which they are (perhaps) able to provide a quanti-




█  4 The minimisation of that which requires ex-
planation 
 
In this paper it will be argued that one feature 
of good ampliative reasoning is that it tends to 
minimise the set of assumptions that are accepted 
without explanation.
13
 It will also be argued that 
delusional ideas lack this feature. Delusional sys-
tems of ideas are bad, it will be suggested, because 
they do not effect a minimisation of that which re-
quires explanation. Let us begin by comparing two 
possible explanations of the solar system. 
 
Explanation one: Originally there was a vast 
cloud with some angular momentum. The 
force of gravity caused this cloud of gas to con-
dense in to a massive core, with other bodies 
coalescing around smaller concentrations of 
mass. This explains why the solar system con-
sists of a number of bodies orbiting a central 
body, why the central body is so much more 
massive than the other bodies, why all the oth-
er bodies orbit the Sun in nearly the same 
plane, why all the bodies (the Sun and the plan-
ets) are nearly spherical, and why all the planets 
orbit the Sun in the same direction. 
 
Explanation two: Originally, there were fifteen 
planets orbiting the Sun. Then a series of me-
teors passed through the solar system, destroy-
ing six of planets. That is why there are now 
nine planets orbiting the Sun. 
 
Both the above explanations might be true, and 
both explain different aspects of the solar system. 
But whether or not either or both are true, there 
seems to be a sense in which the first is superior to 
the second. The first gives us an explanation of 
five aspects of the solar system by mentioning only 
two aspects of the initial state: that there was a 
cloud of gas and it had some angular momentum. 
The explanation, therefore, has fewer unexplained 
components than the data it explains: it carries us, 
as it were, from a larger number of facts to a 
smaller. But the second explanation takes us in the 
opposite direction. In this case, nine features of 
the solar system (the nine planets) are explained 
by postulating fifteen original planets. The num-
ber of basic facts that appear in the explanation is 
larger than the number that is explained. The 
number of components requiring explanation has 
been increased rather than reduced. 
Of course, there are possible circumstances 
under which it might be rational for a scientist to 
advance Explanation Two. If, for example, there 
was some form of independent evidence that there 
had once been fifteen planets, then Explanation 
Two might be rational to accept. But, if there were 
some additional data constituting independent ev-
idence for fifteen planets, then the hypothesis that 
there had been fifteen might still be a hypothesis 
that minimised that which required explanation: it 
might, for example, be the most parsimonious ex-
planation of the additional data. However, if there 
were no additional data pointing towards the ex-
istence of fifteen planets, and Explanation Two 
were merely offered as an explanation of the nine 
planets, then it would not bring about a reduction 
in that which required explanation. It would, 
moreover, seem to be a bizarre explanation to of-
fer. It seems to share some of the “unwarranted 
proliferation” that can be found in some delusion-
al systems of ideas. 
14
 
I have elsewhere argued that much of scien-
tist’s behaviour can be explained as an attempt to 
minimise that which requires explanation, and 
that common-sense realism about material objects 
also has this feature.
15
 The preference for accounts 
that minimise that which requires explanation 
seems to be an important component of both sci-
entific and common-sense rationality. 
 
█  5 Delusional ideas as increasing that which re-
quires explanation 
 
In this section it will be argued that delusional 
systems of ideas, unlike scientific and common-
sense beliefs, tend to increase the set of proposi-
tions or assumptions of the believer that require 
explanation.  
Consider, for example, a person suffering from 
delusional jealousy. Such a person might say their 
spouse is having secret encounters with an unde-
tected lover while taking a brief trip to the shops, 
while visiting a neighbour or even while spending 
an inordinately long time in the bathroom. Their 
assertion of the existence of such an omnipresent 
but undetected lover raises many questions that 
require explanation: Why is the lover never actual-
ly seen? How did the lover manage to enter and 
leave the house undetected? Why would the 
spouse meet their lover in a location where they 
could so easily be caught? And so on.  
Delusional jealousy can be contrasted with 
non-delusional, ordinary (but perhaps unfounded) 
jealousy. A person who is jealous without being 
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delusional may believe their spouse is seeing 
someone else, but is not so likely to embrace ideas 
that “cry out” for explanation as do those of the 
delusional. They are unlikely to claim, for exam-
ple, that their spouse has somehow managed to 
sneak their lover in to the bathroom while the 
jealous partner is still in the house. Non-delusional 
jealousy does not give rise to the much larger 
number of other ideas that stand in need of expla-
nation that are characteristic of delusional jeal-
ousy. Indeed, ordinary jealousy may even reduce 
the number of things that require explanation: the 
hypothesis that their spouse has a secret lover 
might provide a simple explanation of a number of 
aspects of their spouse’s behaviour. 
Another example can serve to illustrate how 
delusional ideas give rise to many things that re-
quire explanation, while similar but non-
delusional ideas do not. Consider a person who 
accepts that Elvis is still alive. We might regard 
such a person as foolish, or gullible, or lacking in 
good intellectual judgement. But such a person 
need not be delusional. However, if a person as-
serted Elvis was still alive and that he (Elvis) was 
following them around, then we may be much 
more inclined to regard the person as delusional. 
And the latter “hypothesis” clearly gives rise to a 
much larger number of things that require expla-
nation: Why is Elvis following them around rather 
than following someone else, or no one at all? Why 
is it Elvis that is following them, rather than, say, 
Harold Holt, or Michael Jackson or Joe Bloggs? 
Why does no one else notice Elvis if he is frequent-
ly in public places? Or, if they are noticing him, 
why does this not get reported? The delusional 
idea has much more features that require explana-
tion than the non-delusional but silly claim that 
Elvis is still alive. 
Many delusions involve firmly held but false 
ideas that attribute to the delusional a much more 
prominent role in the world than common-sense 
would say was reasonable. For example, a delu-
sional patient might say that the evening news on 
the television contains constant references to 
him/her. But, like the idea that Elvis is following 
the delusional around, such a belief has many fea-
tures that require explanation: Why is the news-
reader referring to the delusional rather than to 
any one of the other perhaps millions of viewers? 
How has the newsreader discovered the facts 
about the delusional to which the newsreader is 
supposedly referring? What, if anything, does the 
newsreader hope to gain from these constant ref-
erences? These questions do not arise when a non-
delusional wonders if some item on the news was a 
reference to them. For example, if the newsreader 
says “Police wish to question a man who was seen 
in the vicinity at the time” then a healthy person 
might wonder if this was a reference to them if 
they were in fact in that vicinity at that time. But 
in such a case it easy to give an explanation of why 
what the newsreader said might have been a refer-
ence to them: simply because they were in the vi-
cinity at the time. 
This approach captures the features of delu-
sional ideas we noted in Section 2. On this view, 
what makes an idea delusional is a particular sort 
of relationship between the data or premises avail-
able to the delusional and the conclusion they 
draw from it; specifically, the conclusion has more 
unexplained features than the data it supposedly 
explains. This differentiates delusional thinking 
from merely committing logical fallacies: in a fal-
lacious inference there is no necessary relationship 
between the number things unexplained by the 
premises and the number left unexplained by the 
conclusion.
16
 It also provides a natural account of 
how delusional thinking is distinct from simply 
not being very bright; indeed, the increased com-
plexity of the explanations offered by the delu-
sional may in some cases require above average 
intelligence to construct and recall. 
 
█  6 A comparison of the view offered here with a 
related view 
 
A view of delusions that might seem to have 
some similarity to the one offered here has been 
developed in Leeser and O’Donohue (hereafter 
L&O).
17
 They argue that when a delusional is con-
fronted with an apparent falsification of their be-
lief, unlike scientists, they do not produce a sim-
ple, testable explanation for the apparent falsifica-
tion; instead, they respond with an alternative ex-
planation that is more complicated, less testable, 
and provides no new corroborations.
18
 
While the position of this paper has some simi-
larity to L&O, it also has differences. On our view, 
the delusional offers an explanation that increases 
the number of facts left unexplained. This plausi-
bly resembles the notion of increasing complexity, 
but need not be precisely the same as it. One way 
of bringing out the difference is as follows: We 
maximise the simplicity of an explanation (or min-
imise its complexity) by, roughly, minimising the 
number of facts mentioned in it.
19
 But this need 
not necessarily be the same as minimising the 
number of facts that require explanation. It may be 
that some facts do not need explanation, or stand 
less in need of explanation than others. The mat-
ter is complex, and has given rise to extensive dis-
cussion in the philosophy of science.
20
 But the es-
sential point is that minimising the total number 
of facts in an explanation need not necessarily be 
the same as minimising the number of explana-
tion-requiring facts. 
There is an important difference between min-
imising complexity and minimising the number of 
facts requiring explanation. Explanation brings 




standing of why it obtains. There is, therefore, a 
sense in which reducing the number of facts left 
unexplained brings about an increase in under-
standing.
21
 Conversely, increasing the number of 
things left unexplained decreases understanding. 
On the view advocated here, the salient difference 
between a healthy person and a delusional is not 
that the delusional has a less simple view of the 
world but that, seen from the point of view of the 
delusional, the world is less understandable. The 
delusional may be able to offer an explanation of 
certain aspects of the world, but at the cost of an 
overall reduction in their level of understanding of 
the world around them. 
This provides an account of why the delusion-
al’s view of the world is epistemically inferior to 
the view of common-sense, and of science: it is-
sues in a reduced level of understanding of the 
world. In this respect, the view offered here would 
seem to be preferable to the view of L&O. Accord-
ing to L&O, scientists, unlike delusionals, replace 
falsified hypotheses with simple hypotheses. But 
even this is granted, it would remain unclear how 
scientist’s behaviour is epistemically better. It 
might perhaps be asserted that simple hypotheses 
are better because they are more likely to be true, 
but the question of whether simplicity is corelated 
with truth is highly controversial.
22
 However, an 
explanation of the epistemic superiority of science 
and common-sense does flow naturally from the 
account offered here: they are epistemically pref-
erable because they increase understanding. 
 
█  7 The “epistemic innocence” of delusions 
 
According to this paper, delusions decrease a pa-
tient’s level of understanding. Prima facie, this might 
seem to be in tension with the suggestion that delu-
sions can actually bring about an overall increase in 
the patient’s capacity to explain their environment, 
and thereby be “epistemically innocent”. 
The idea of epistemic innocence was introduced 
by Lisa Bortolotti.
23
 Bortolotti compares the no-
tion of epistemic innocence to innocence in a legal 
context. It might be the case that person A is guilty 
of causing harm to another. Perhaps they deliber-
ately shot another person. Under usual circum-
stances, if A deliberately shot another, then A 
would be guilty of murder. But suppose the person 
shot was a terrorist who was about to detonate a 
bomb that would have killed very many others. 
Under such circumstances we might conclude that 
the shooter was innocent of murder since their ac-
tion prevented a much larger loss of life. Bortolotti 
suggests that, in something the same way, a delu-
sion might be “epistemically innocent”. 
Suppose Smith continues to believe, for exam-
ple, that their spouse is faithful to them despite an 
abundance of very clear evidence to the contrary. 
If the tenacity with which Smith clung to this be-
lief was strong enough, and the evidence for infi-
delity compelling enough, we might say that Smith 
was delusional. But Smith’s adopting this delu-
sional belief might, for Smith, also have epistemic 
benefits. Suppose Smith were to accept the (true 
and evidence-supported) belief that their spouse 
was unfaithful. This might have a very bad effect 
on Smith’s self-esteem and anxiety. The effect 
might be so severe that Smith’s overall cognitive 
performance might become much worse than it 
would otherwise have been. By having the delu-
sion that their spouse is faithful, Smith might 
thereby be maximising their overall epistemic per-
formance. This one bit of irrationality results in 
the maintenance of much higher levels of rational-
ity overall. In this way, the delusion can be said to 
be “epistemically innocent”, in something the 
same way that the person who shoots the terrorist 
can be innocent if doing so prevents much greater 
loss of life. 
The position adopted here is neutral with re-
spect to the question of whether delusions can be 
“epistemically innocent” in this sense. This paper is 
compatible with the suggestion that adopting a de-
lusion might, via causal processes such as keeping 
anxiety low, result in better cognitive function 
overall than would rejecting it. It may even be the 
case that adopting a delusion might, via such a 
mechanism, result in a patient’s general level of un-
derstanding being higher. But, provided that the 
position adopted in this paper is carefully stated, 
this can be compatible with the view adopted here. 
We need here to distinguish between two ways 
in which adopting some belief can affect an 
agent’s level of understanding. A belief can affect 
understanding by establishing or failing to establish 
explanatory relations with other beliefs, or it can 
causally interact with other beliefs without affect-
ing explanatory relations.  
We can illustrate this with an example. A scien-
tist might explain a range of phenomena associat-
ed with heat by adopting the theory that heat is 
molecular motion. The scientist’s understanding is 
increased in virtue of the logical relations holding 
between the explanans (in this case, the theory 
heat is molecular motion) and the phenomena the 
theory explains. And this increase in understand-
ing occurs independently of whatever the scien-
tist’s psychological state might be. But, for exam-
ple, a student’s belief they will pass an examination 
might aid their understanding by lowering their 
anxiety. However, the belief “I will pass the exam” 
need not explain anything in the examination.  
The only thesis offered in this paper is that de-
lusions decrease understanding as a result of ex-
planatory relations failing to hold between those 
delusions and other facts of the patient’s experi-
ence. No claim is made about what effect delu-
sions might have, via other mechanisms, on the 
patient’s ability to understand. 
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█  8 Delusions as imaginings 
 
A view of delusions that might seem to sit un-
comfortably with the view advocated here has 
been proposed by Gregory Currie.
24
 Currie has 
suggested that delusions (or more precisely, those 
delusions associated with schizophrenia) are not 
first-order beliefs at all, but are rather “cognitive 
hallucinations”, or, imaginative states that are mis-
identified by their subjects as beliefs. 
Currie’s position may be explained as follows: 
A delusional patient first imagines some state of 
affairs S, and then misidentifies their own mental 
state as one of believing rather than imagining. 
Consequently, the patient comes to mistakenly 
think that they believe that S obtains. 
We need not here undertake a critical assess-
ment of Currie’s suggestion. Here it will merely be 
argued that even if Currie is correct, his position 
would require at most a modification or re-
expression of the view advocated here: its central 
idea would remain unchallenged. 
A key point to note in this context is that the 
patient’s mental state, whether it is a belief, an im-
agining, or something else, has content. The pa-
tient believes, or imagines, that P, where “P” has 
meaning or content. And since “P” has content, it 
can have logical and explanatory relations to other 
propositions. Consequently, it can give rise to the 
need for explanations.  
This can be illustrated with an example. Let us 
take as an example of a possible delusion: “When the 
neighbour’s dog barks it is signalling the time has 
come for me to go out and commit some crime.” Let 
us grant Currie is right and that the (perhaps schizo-
phrenic) patient first imagines that the dog’s bark 
has this significance and then they mistakenly come 
to think that they believe it has this significance. For 
our purposes, the central point is that whether the 
patient believes or only imagines, the state of affairs 
(whether believed or imagined) has features requir-
ing explanation. These features include: How is the 
dog conveying this information in a bark? Why can 
only the patient detect its significance? How does the 
dog know the time has come to commit the crime? 
And so on. Whether delusions are beliefs or imagin-
ings, they seem to give rise to the need for more ex-
planations than more typical beliefs. 
Now, in the light of this, let us consider again 
Currie’s suggestion that a delusional patient does not 
actually believe their delusion, they rather mistake 
what is in fact merely an imagining for a belief. It is 
possible to grant what Currie is suggesting, and at 
the same time preserve the core idea defended in this 
paper, simply by saying that what the delusional is 
doing is (mistakenly) thinking they believe a propo-
sition that fails to minimise the number of things 
that require explanation. On such a view, the notion 
of “failing to minimise the number of things requir-
ing explanation” still plays a key role in differentiat-
ing delusions from non-delusional mental states.  
 
█  9 Difficult cases 
  
One problem for existing characterisations of 
delusions is that they find it difficult to exclude 
certain non-delusional ideas in a principled or 
non-ad hoc manner. A religious person would not 
generally be classified as delusional, even though 
some religious beliefs might be both bizarre and 
dogmatically held. This raises the question: Why 
are bizarre, dogmatically held religious beliefs not 
to be classified as delusions? One perhaps initially 
tempting suggestion is that such a belief need not 
be delusional if it is shared by a community. But 
this has at least two problems. An innovative sci-
entist might be, for a while, the only person with 
some bizarre idea, they might hold it with surpris-
ing conviction, and yet not be delusional. For ex-
ample, perhaps in 1904 Einstein was the only per-
son who held space contracts and time slows with 
increasing velocity. And there is historical evi-
dence he held this idea with extraordinary confi-
dence.
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 But we would not say Einstein was delu-
sional. Moreover, there are plausibly cases of entire 
communities suffering from a delusion. One possi-
ble example of this might be the “Heaven’s Gate” 
cult, the members of which all committed suicide 
thinking they would join a spaceship that they be-
lieved was concealed in the tail of the Hale-Bopp 
comet. It seems to be possible for an idea to be de-
lusional and yet held by an entire community. 
There are a number of reasons for thinking we 
may be able to distinguish between delusions and 
non-delusional religious beliefs using the notion of 
minimising that which requires explanation. First-
ly, a delusional religious idea frequently attributes 
some special or unique property to its adherent: 
for example, that the person has been chosen by 
God, from amongst all others, to perform some 
task, or that the individual is uniquely guilty or 
sinful in some way. But such strongly self-focussed 
ideas raise questions that standard religious beliefs 
do not: “What is it about the individual that mer-
its such special attention from God?”, “In what 
way is the individual different from all others that 
explains their unique status? “Why is this differen-
tiating feature not detectable or acknowledged by 
others?”
26
 Secondly, non-delusional religious ideas 
are frequently held by many persons. For example, 
in perhaps most societies, a majority of persons 
believe God exists. But a delusional may be the on-
ly person who subscribes to their particular idea. 
And so, the delusional will be confronted with a 
question that non-delusional religious people gen-
erally will not: “Why is it that only they have this 
belief?” This question arises whether the delusion-
al idea is religious in nature or not. These ques-
tions: “What is uniquely special about the believ-




arise with, for example, delusions of persecution 
or grandiosity. 
As noted above, it does seem to be possible for 
all members of a community, such as a cult, to 
share some delusional idea. The view advocated 
here allows this as a possibility. On the view advo-
cated here, an idea that is held by just one person 
will, all other things being equal, leave more re-
quiring explanation than a belief that is shared by 
a community. It will, for example, need to be ex-
plained why others do not accept that idea. But of 
course, even if an idea is shared by all the members 
of some community, its content may be such that 
it gives rise to the need for a large number of ex-
planations. And if the number of explanations to 
which it gives rise is large enough, it may, on the 
view defended here, qualify as delusional. 
Another difficult case for any account of the 
epistemological features of delusions is what 
Thomas Kuhn called “Normal Science”.
27
 Accord-
ing to Kuhn, during periods of Normal Science, 
scientists uncritically accept the core theories of 
their paradigm, refuse to admit apparent and even 
well attested-to counter-examples, and apparently 
exhibit a strong emotional commitment to those 
core theories. In these respects, the behaviour of 
scientists appears to resemble that of delusional 
patients. But while we feel that delusional patients 
are clearly irrational, science is generally held up as 
exemplifying rationality par excellence. 
I think that the account offered here can satis-
factorily deal with the epistemological differences 
between delusions and Normal Science, but first 
we must make a brief digression in to the history 
and philosophy of science. It is widely accepted 
that well established and fundamental scientific 
laws are not rejected by scientists until they have a 
better replacement for those laws at hand.
28
 This 
aspect of scientific behaviour can be easily ex-
plained if we say that scientists aim to minimise 
that which requires explanation. Suppose some 
law is well established and fundamental. Then, it is 
likely that it provides an explanation of a wide 
range of phenomena. So, if scientists reject it with-
out having some not-already-falsified alternative to 
hand, there will be a wide range of phenomena 
(those that were explained by the rejected theory) 
that are now left unexplained. To reject a theory 
without having a replacement is therefore to in-
crease the number of facts that require explanation. 
So, the tendency of scientists to not reject a theory 
– even a theory with apparent and well attested-to 
counter-examples – until they have a replacement 
for it, can be explained if it is said scientists aim to 
minimise that which requires explanation. 
However, the tenacity with which a delusional 
patient clings to their belief in the face of apparent 
counter-evidence generally cannot be explained in 
this manner. Suppose a delusional patient asserts 
that when their spouse spends a long time in the 
bathroom, they are meeting a secret lover. Reject-
ing this belief would not leave the delusional with 
no explanation at all of why their spouse is spend-
ing a long time in the bathroom. There is no 
shortage of other possible explanations ready to 
hand: perhaps they are washing their hair, perhaps 
they are simply day-dreaming, or enjoying the pri-
vacy, or enjoying a brief respite from their (delu-
sional) partner who is behaving oddly, and so on. 
Or to take another example, a delusional might 
think that when the neighbours play music loudly 
it is to persecute him or her. But again, it is easy to 
find alternative explanations: perhaps it is some-
one’s birthday or an event of some other kind is 
being celebrated, or perhaps they are simply hav-
ing a noisy house party, as people do from time to 
time. Moreover, accepting any one of these alter-
native explanations does not require us to in any 
way increase or expand the set of things we al-
ready believe, since we already know that, as a 
matter of fact, people do sometimes spend a long 
time in the bathroom to wash their hair, or have 
noisy house parties. Accepting any of these alter-
native explanations does not require us to increase 
the number of things that are left unexplained. 
So, in summary, we can explain the tendency of 
scientists to cling tenaciously to accepted theories 
in the face of empirical counter evidence. This can 
be explained as due to a reluctance to abandon one 
explanation of the anomalous phenomena until 
another is available; this in turn can be seen as a 
consequence of a general tendency to minimise 
that which requires explanation. But the tendency 
of the delusional to cling to their belief cannot be 
accounted for in the same way. Generally, it will 
be easy to offer alternative explanations for the 
phenomena the delusional sees as supporting their 
belief. Moreover, using these alternative explana-
tions will not result in any increase in that which 
requires explanation. The behaviour of scientists, 
but not the behaviour of delusional patients, can 
be seen as a consequence of a tendency to mini-
mise that which requires explanation. 
This same line of thought can be used to deal 
with what might seem like a natural objection to 
the view offered here. Sometimes a delusional per-
son might offer a highly unified or simple explana-
tion for a wide range of phenomena. For example, 
they might explain a series of misfortunes such a 
flat tyre, an appliance ceasing to work, a plant in 
their garden dying and so on all in the same way: 
they might, perhaps, claim that all these different 
events have occurred because they are being per-
secuted some government organisation. In ex-
plaining a wide range of phenomena in terms of a 
single hypothesis it might seem that the delusional 
is effecting a reduction of the number of things 
that require explanation. So, it might be objected, 
cases of this sort constitute a counter-example to 
the view defended here. 
Epistemological aspects of delusional thinking 
 
133 
However, on closer inspection it turns out the de-
lusional’s account does not minimise that which re-
quires explanation. First, let us note that the phe-
nomena that the delusional might see as confirming 
their view they are being persecuted (flat tyres, bro-
ken appliances etc.) will generally be able to be ex-
plained in other, already familiar, ways. Flat tyres do 
occur from time to time. We will be able, therefore, 
to explain the phenomena using already established 
facts or tendencies. So, it will be possible to explain 
the phenomena without having to postulate any new 
facts or tendencies: An explanation can be given that 
does not involve any increase in the number of things 
that require explanation. 
However, the explanation of their misfortunes 
given by the delusional person does give rise to a 
host of facts that require explanation: Why is the 
government agency persecuting them?, Why them 
rather than someone else, or many others? How is 
the agency managing to damage appliances with-
out being detected? And so on. The delusional’s 
account does in fact actually increase the number 
of things that require explanation. The unified ex-
planation given by the delusional of a range of 
phenomena might initially seem to reduce the 
number of things requiring explanation, but on 
closer inspection this turns out to not be so. 
Another objection might be raised against the 
view advocated here. Sometimes a delusional per-
son may see certain events as highly significant, and 
much more in need of explanation than other 
events. Moreover, it might seem that only their de-
lusion is able to explain these “highly significant” 
events. For example, a person suffering from delu-
sions of persecution might notice that on a number 
of occasions the neighbours start to play loud music 
when the delusional’s favourite T.V. programme is 
playing. People do sometimes play loud music, but 
this fact in itself does not explain why the loud mu-
sic is played when the delusional’s favourite pro-
gramme is on. Moreover, there is at least a prima fa-
cie plausibility that it is only the delusional’s belief 
they are being persecuted that can explain this fact. 
All other more “common-sense” beliefs might seem 
to leave it unexplained. So, in cases of this sort, it 
might seem, it is actually the delusional belief that 
minimises that which requires explanation. 
But if we consider this type of case for closely, 
it becomes clear the delusional’s idea actually leads 
in the opposite direction – towards the positing of 
more facts that require explanation. First, note 
that not all beliefs of the form “My neighbours are 
persecuting me” need be delusional. Sometimes 
such a belief can be perfectly reasonable, and true 
in fact. If the view advocated here is to be correct, 
what needs to be the case is that the delusional as-
sertions of this kind effect a greater increase in 
that which requires explanation than the, other-
wise similar, more reasonable claims. And on clos-
er inspection this proves to be the case. 
For definiteness, let us focus on a hypothetical 
case in which it is asserted that the neighbours are 
persecuting an individual (“the victim”), and the 
only thing that this idea is used to explain is that 
loud music has been played when the victim’s fa-
vourite programme is on. Such an idea need not be 
delusional. Whether it is delusional or not might 
depend on the following factors: 
 
(i) How frequently has the music been played 
while the programme is on: Is this clearly 
more than might be merely due to chance? 
(ii) Does the victim have any evidence that the 
neighbours know the programme is the vic-
tim’s favourite? 
(iii) Can the victim give some explanation of why 
the neighbours are persecuting him/her? 
 
If the answer to the above questions is in every 
case “Yes”, then we might be inclined to say the 
idea is not delusional, and might even be well-
founded. But if the answer to the questions is in 
every case “No” then we might see the belief as de-
lusional. For our purposes, however, the im-
portant point to note is that if the answer to the 
questions is “No” then the assertion that the 
neighbours are persecuting the victim brings 
about an increase in the number of things that re-
quire explanation. 
First, let suppose that the answer to the first 
question is “No” and that the number of times the 
music has been played when the programme is on 
is no more than we would expect by chance. Then: 
there actually is no fact that requires an independ-
ent explanation, beyond appeal to the laws of 
chance. In such a case the delusional idea is doing 
no genuine explanatory work; it does not reduce 
the number of things that require explanation 
since the fact it supposedly explains does not actu-
ally need an explanation at all. 
If the remaining questions are both answered 
“No” then the delusional idea gives rise to the 
need for more explanations: “How do the neigh-
bours know the programme is the victim’s favour-
ite?” and “Why are the neighbours persecuting the 
victim?” So, if all the questions are answered “No” 
– the situation in which we are perhaps most in-
clined to say the belief is delusional – then the idea 
fails to explain any fact that actually requires ex-
planation, and itself gives rise to the need for more 
explanations. So, it brings about an increase in that 
which requires explanation.  
We can contrast this with the situation in 
which the questions (i)-(iii) are all answered “Yes”. 
If the first question is answered “Yes”, then there 
is a fact cannot be explained merely by appealing 
to the laws of chance. Moreover, if the other ques-
tions are both answered “Yes” then the explana-
tion offered – that the neighbours are persecuting 




ditional explanations. In this case – where we are 
perhaps least inclined to see the belief as delusion-
al – it does bring about a reduction in that which 
requires explanation. In summary, on closer in-
spection, this example, at least does cohere with 
the idea that delusional ideas increase that which 
requires explanation. 
Perhaps the most difficult class of cases for the 
view advocated here are sophisticated deviant but 
non-delusional beliefs. I believe that the view ad-
vocated here may be able to deal with cases of this 
sort, but it must be emphasised that my remarks 
about cases of this sort will be incomplete. 
Let us take as our example of a sophisticated 
deviant belief the belief in the existence of the 
Multiverse: or a vast structure containing many 
universes, some of which may be like ours, but 
others which might be radically unlike ours.
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Some of these other universes might be, by our 
standards, very bizarre or weird. The hypothesis 
that such other universes exist is, in part, put for-
ward to explain why it is that the very early stages 
of our universe had certain highly improbable fea-
tures. A number of scientists have noted that these 
highly improbable features seem to be necessary 
for the development of life in the universe: if these 
features had not been present, then life would not 
have evolved. Moreover, the staggering improba-
bility of these features makes it intellectually un-
satisfactory to assert that the fact they obtained in 
the early stages of the universe is merely due to 
good luck.
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 However, if we assert that there is a 
“Multiverse” containing an extremely large num-
ber of universes then it may be highly likely that 
one, or even a fairly large number of them, contain 
the right conditions for the life. The hypothesis of 
the Multiverse turns what seems extremely unlike-
ly in to what is only to be expected, and so pro-
vides an explanation for the fact that certainly 
highly improbable features of the universe exist. 
For our purposes, the aspect of this situation 
we need to note is that it has proved extremely dif-
ficult to provide any satisfactory explanation of 
the highly improbable features of the early uni-
verse. All proposed accounts are either highly 
speculative, or only doubtfully genuine explana-
tions, or in some other way intellectually unsatis-
factory.
31
 Scientists who accept the hypothesis of 
the Multiverse do not, therefore, have available an 
alternative satisfactory explanation which they 
choose not to accept. All available options are un-
satisfactory or implausible in one way or another.  
In this respect the hypothesis of the Multiverse 
differs from delusional beliefs. The delusional 
generally will have a number of perfectly ordinary 
alternative explanations for the phenomena they 
see as supporting their delusion. But in the case of 
the Multiverse, all the other options are problem-
atic in one way or another. Hence, there is a signif-
icant epistemological difference between the ap-
parently bizarre but sophisticated belief in the 
Multiverse, and delusional beliefs. 
 
█  10 Summary 
 
In this paper it has been argued that delusional 
beliefs tend to increase that which requires expla-
nation. In this respect they are unlike common-
sense explanations for events; they are also unlike 
scientific explanations. Delusional beliefs leave 
more “Why?” questions unanswered and so give 
the delusional a decreased understanding of the 
world around them. They may, therefore, be re-
garded as epistemologically inferior to both sci-
ence and common-sense. 
It has been argued that this account can natu-
rally deal with typical cases of delusional beliefs, 
but also that it can deal with the more difficult 
cases. Specifically, it has been argued that it can 
deal with religious beliefs, and with the often 
dogmatically held beliefs of Kuhnian science. It 
can also explain why delusional explanations that 
on the face of it seem simple and unified actually 
increase that which requires explanation. The 
view advocated here may also be able to account 
for sophisticated bizarre but non-delusional be-
liefs, although our discussion of this type of case 
was not complete. But: the problem still remains 
of stipulating exactly where the line is to be drawn 
between a belief that is delusional, and one that is 
highly irrational without actually being a delusion. 
However, this does not mean there is no value at 
all in the view defended here. It has been argued 
that what differentiates delusional from non-
delusional beliefs is the extent to which they leave 
“Why?” questions unanswered. It identifies the 
relevant dimension or respect in virtue of which 
delusional beliefs differ from healthy or non-
delusional beliefs. In this respect it enables us to 
move forward in increasing our understanding of 
the nature of delusional beliefs. 
 
█  Notes 
 
1
 The American Psychiatric Association (DSM-IV) as-
serts that psychoses are states involving either delusions 
or hallucinations. 
2
 Cf. A.S. DAVID, On the impossibility of defining delu-
sions. 
3
 Cf. K. JASPERS, General psychopathology, p. 95. 
4
 Cf. T.S. KUHN, The structure of scientific revolutions. 
5
 Amongst these apparently bizarre beliefs we might 
include: solipsism or the doctrine, held by an individu-
al, that only they exist; idealism, some versions of which 
assert that objects exist only when perceived by some 
person or other; scepticism, some versions of which 
hold that we know nothing and modal realism, which 
holds that if something might have happened (e.g. Hit-
ler winning the war) then there exists a world in which 
that did happen (i.e. there exists a world in which Hitler 
won the war). 
 





 For example, the American Psychiatric Association in 
DSM-IV-TR (p. 765) says that for a belief to be a delu-
sion, it must not be one ordinarily accepted by other 
members of the person’s culture or subculture. 
7
 This appears to be true of Albert Einstein. A series of 
experimental results, starting in 1925, due to Dayton 
Miller consistently obtained results that appeared to 
refute Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity (cf. D. 
MILLER, The Ether-Drift experiment and the determina-
tion of absolute motion of the Earth). Miller’s apparatus 
was the most accurate in existence at the time. It was 
not until 1955 that Miller’s anomalous result was ex-
plained. Nonetheless, during this period, Einstein re-
mained very confident his theory was correct. Cf. B. 
EASLEA, Liberation and the aims of science, pp. 74-75.  
8
 Certain extreme or bizarre religious cults, such as the 
“Heaven’s Gate” cult, for example, might fall in to this 
category. 
9
 The role of criteria of this sort in identifying (but not 
defining) delusional beliefs is emphasised in A.S. DA-
VID, On the impossibility of defining delusions, cit., pp. 
17-20. 
10
 The view that public rejection of his ideas contribut-
ed to Boltzmann’s suicide is widespread (cf., for exam-
ple, K.R. POPPER, Unended quest, p. 187. 
11
 This neutral or non-committal sense of “accept” is 
derived from Karl Popper’s philosophy of science. Pop-
per holds that scientists neither do, nor they ought to, 
believe the scientific theories to which they subscribe.  
12
 The fact that there are “shades of grey” between be-
ing delusional and simply having odd beliefs raises the 
question of just when a potentially delusional person is 
to be diagnosed as delusional. The present author will 
not address himself to this question. However, it does 
not follow that the position adopted here is of no diag-
nostic value. There are two distinct questions: (a) What 
properties of beliefs (or other mental states) are rele-
vant in identifying the presence of delusional thinking? 
and (b) To what extent or degree must these properties 
be present for a patient to be classified as delusional? 
Although the two questions are distinct, it is clear that 
both are relevant for clinical purposes, and that (a) is 
logically prior to (b). The current paper does not at-
tempt to answer (b), but does claim to offer an answer 
to (a).  
13
 I have elsewhere argued that it is a feature of good 
scientific reasoning that it effects a reduction in the 
minimisation of that which requires explanation. Cf. J. 
WRIGHT, Scientific rationality and the minimisation of 
that which requires explanation. 
14
 It might perhaps be objected that this illustrative ex-
ample presupposes metaphysical realism. However, this 
need not be so. It only presupposes that postulated 
states of affairs give rise to the need for explanations. 
But this surely need not entail that a metaphysical real-
ist view of such states of affairs must be adopted. It 
would appear to be possible to accept they give rise to 
the need for explanations within, for example, the in-
ternal realism of Hilary Putnam. Putnam’s internal real-
ism allows that entities postulated by science can be 
used in explanations.  
15
 Cf. J. WRIGHT, Scientific rationality and the minimi-
sation of that which requires explanation, cit. Also, the 
final chapter of J. WRIGHT, Science and the theory of ra-





 We can give examples of fallacious inferences in 
which the conclusion leaves unexplained more, the 
same number, or fewer things than the premises. As-
sume the “atomic” propositions P, Q, R etc. to each 
leave the same number of things unexplained. In the 
case of the fallacious inference P ˫ Q, the premise and 
conclusion leave the same number of things unex-
plained, in the fallacious inference P&Q ˫ R the conclu-
sion leaves fewer things unexplained, and in the case of 
the fallacious inference  
P ˫ Q&R the conclusion leaves more unexplained. 
17
 Cf. J. LEESER, W. O’DONOHUE, What is a delusion? 
Epistemological dimensions. 
18
 Leeser and O’Donohue also argue that (i) delusions 
are protected beliefs made unfalsifiable either in prin-
ciple or because the agent refuses to admit anything as 
a potential falsifier; (ii) the protected belief is not typi-
cally considered a “properly basic” belief; (iii) the belief 
is not of the variety of protected scientific beliefs; (iv) 
the subject has a strong emotional attachment to the 
belief; and (v) the belief is typically supported by (or 
originates from) trivial occurrences that are interpreted 
by the subject as highly unusual, significant, having per-
sonal reference, or some combination of these. The po-
sition adopted here is in agreement with (i), (ii) and 
(iii), and is consistent with (iv) and (v). However, the 
position adopted here goes further than Leeser and 
O’Donohue in explaining just how the beliefs of delu-
sional persons differ from scientific beliefs. Here it has 
been argued that the behaviour of scientists can be seen 
as following from the aim of minimising the number of 
facts requiring explanation, while the behaviour of the 
delusional patient cannot be seen in this way. 
19
 It is perhaps also worth distinguishing the notion of 
minimising the number of explanation-requiring facts 
from the notion of testability. The two notions are dis-
tinct. Although if a hypothesis is testable, it will in gen-
eral give rise to explanation-requiring facts, the con-
verse need not necessarily be the case: That a hypothe-
sis, or a delusion, or a belief of any sort gives rise to ex-
planation-requiring facts need not entail its testability. 
For example, suppose a delusional believes that God 
will single them out for persecution. This belief gives 
rise to the need for an explanation: Why will this par-
ticular individual be singled out for persecution? But it 
is at least doubtful that this belief would be testable. 
The thesis that delusions give rise to the need for ex-
planations would seem to be distinct from the thesis 
that they are testable. 
20
 Not all truths stand in need of an explanation, or 
stand equally in need of an explanation. There seems to 
be a sense in which necessary truths do not stand in 
need of explanation. But according to Saul Kripke, 
there are some empirical, a posteriori truths, by science, 
that are discovered by scientific investigation to be 
true, but which are nonetheless necessarily true (cf. S. 
KRIPKE, Naming and necessity). Stephen Toulmin has 
argued that each explanatory system in science carries 
with what he calls an ideal of natural order (cf. S. 
TOULMIN, Foresight and understanding). An ideal of 
natural order, according to Toulmin, requires no expla-
nation. And so, on Toulmin’s view, one way in which 
science can reduce the number of things requiring ex-
planation is by using in its explanations statements of 
“natural order”, rather than statements of similar ex-






ral order. It would take us too far from our central con-
cerns here to discuss in detail the differences between 
maximising simplicity and minimising the number of 
facts requiring explanation; the matter is gone in to in 
more detail in J. WRIGHT, Realism and equivalence. 
However, the two notions surely are distinct. 
21
 This is emphasised in M. FRIEDMAN, Explanation and 
scientific understanding. 
22
 Cf., for example, S. PSILLOS, How science tracks the 
truth; A. BAKER, Simplicity. 
23
 Cf. L. BORTOLOTTI, The epistemic innocence of moti-
vated delusions. 
24
 Cf. G. CURRIE, Imagination, delusions and hallucinations. 
25
 Cf. supra, fn. 5. Also, when asked how he would have 
reacted if an experiment had found a result contrary to 
his theory, Einstein responded: “Then I would have felt 
sorry for the Dear Lord – the theory is correct”. Cf. A. 
PAIS, Subtle is the Lord: The science and life of Albert 
Einstein. 
26
 Sometimes a person might believe, for example, that 
they have been chosen by God to perform some task 
(such as missionary or aid work, for example) without 
being delusional. But in such cases this belief will gen-
erally give rise to substantially fewer “Why?” questions 
than the belief of the delusional. A doctor or nurse who 
believes God wishes them to undertake aid work in a 
poor country can give at least a partial answer to why 
they have been chosen: because of their training. Also, 
the question: “Why has God chosen you and no one 
else?” does not arise, because many people do under-
take aid work. Such a person will generally not believe 
they have been uniquely chosen. 
27
 T.S. KUHN, The structure of scientific revolutions. 
28
 This idea is a major feature of Kuhn cf. T.S. KUHN, 
The structure of scientific revolutions. It is also accepted 
by Imre Lakatos (cf. I. LAKATOS, Falsification and the 
methodology of scientific research programmes) and Larry 
Laudan (cf. L. LAUDAN, Progress and its problems). 
29
 Cf., for example, P.C.W. DAVIES, Multiverse cosmolog-
ical models. 
30
 For example, according to one estimate, the probabil-
ity of our universe, by chance, containing the necessary 




Cf., for example, P.C.W. 
DAVIES, God and the new physics, p. 181. 
31
 The main explanations of the highly improbable “fi-
ne-tuning” of the early stages of the universe are: (1): 
that it is sheer good luck, (2): that God ensured the 
universe was in the highly improbable right state, (3): 
the “anthropic” principle and (4): the hypothesis of the 
Multiverse. (1) seems unsatisfactory given the extreme 
improbability of the early stages of the universe (As 
noted in previously, the probability has been estimated 
to be 10
-60
) (2) is, of course, to say the least, controver-
sial amongst naturalistically inclined philosophers. The 
status of (3) – the anthropic principle – is also highly 
controversial, as is (4), the hypothesis of the Multiverse. 
 
█  References 
 
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION (1994). Diagnostic 
and statistical manual of mental disorders, fourth edi-







AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION (2000). Diag-
nostic and statistical manual of mental disorders, 
fourth edition – text revision (DSM-IV-TR), APA 
Press, Washington (DC). 
BAKER, A. (2004). Simplicity. In: E.N. ZALTA (ed.), Stan-
ford encyclopedia of philosophy, substantial revision 
2016, URL: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/simpli 
city/. 
BORTOLOTTI, L. (2015). The epistemic innocence of mo-
tivated delusions. In: «Consciousness and Cogni-
tion», vol. XXXIII, pp. 490-499. 
CURRIE, G. (2000). Imagination, delusions and halluci-
nations. In: «Mind and Language», vol. XV, n. 1, 
pp. 168-183. 
DAVID, A.S. (1999). On the impossibility of defining de-
lusions. In: «Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psycholo-
gy», vol. VI, n. 1, pp. 17-20. 
DAVIES, P.C.W. (1983). God and the new physics, Simon 
and Schuster, London/New York/Toronto/Sydney. 
DAVIES, P.C.W. (2004). Multiverse cosmological models. 
In: «Modern Physics Letter - A», vol. XIX, n. 10, 
pp. 727-743. 
EASLEA, B. (1973). Liberation and the aims of science, 
Chatto and Windus, London.  
FRIEDMAN, M. (1974). Explanation and scientific under-
standing. In: «The Journal of Philosophy», vol. 
LXXI, n. 1, pp. 5-19. 
JASPERS, K. (1963). General psychopathology (1913), 
translated by J. HOENIG, M. HAMILTON, Manches-
ter University Press, Manchester. 
KRIPKE, S. (1980). Naming and necessity, Harvard Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge (MA). 
KUHN, T.S. (2012). The structure of scientific revolutions 
(1962), University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2012. 
LAKATOS, I. (1970). Falsification and the methodology of 
scientific research programmes. In: I. LAKATOS, A. 
MUSGRAVE (eds.), Criticism and the growth of 
knowledge, Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, pp. 91-195. 
LAUDAN, L. (1978). Progress and its problems, 
Routledge, London/New York. 
LEESER, J., O’DONOHUE, W. (1999). What is a delusion? 
Epistemological dimensions. In: «Journal of Abnor-
mal Psychology», vol. CVIII, n. 4, pp. pp. 687-694. 
MILLER, D. (1933). The Ether-Drift experiment and the 
determination of absolute motion of the Earth. In: 
«Review of Modern Physics», vol. V, pp. 203-242.  
PAIS, A. (2005). Subtle is the Lord: The science and life of 
Albert Einstein, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
POPPER, K.R. (1992). Unended quest. An intellectual bi-
ography (1976), Routledge, London/New York. 
PSILLOS, S. (1999). How science tracks the truth, 
Routledge, London/New York. 
TOULMIN, S. (1961). Foresight and understanding, 
Hutchinson, London. 
WRIGHT, J. (1988). Scientific rationality and the mini-
misation of that which requires explanation. In: 
«Metascience», vol. VI, pp. 109-128. 
WRIGHT, J. (1989). Realism and equivalence. In: «Er-
kenntnis», vol. XXXI, n. 1, pp. 109-128. 
WRIGHT, J. (1991). Science and the theory of rationality, 
Aldershot, Aveburry. 
